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Securing water for Chile is securing its future. […] We must see 
the supply and use of water as a state policy and a national 
objective.1 
 
- Michelle Bachelet, President of Chile, 24 March 2015.2 
 
On 24 March 2015, during the sixth and most acute year of a major drought 
affecting Chile, the country’s President, Michelle Bachelet (2014-18), launched the 
National Drought Management Plan (Gobierno de Chile, 2015b). With a budget of 
USD 152 million for its first year, the Plan entailed immediate and short-term 
drought alleviation responses as well as medium and long-term measures to 
increase the availability of water, primarily through the construction of small and 
large-scale infrastructure, following the country’s tradition of “technocratic 
approaches to water management and governance” (Budds, 2013: 313). A 
distinguishing feature of the Plan is that it scaled up an incipient infrastructural 
solution to both address existing and projected water scarcity, and to respond to 
future water demand: seawater desalination. The Plan included a proposal to 
construct five new desalination plants along the coast of northern and central Chile 
– the regions worst affected by the drought – primarily to produce drinking water.3 
 
These proposals reflect a growing global trend to introduce desalination to both 
complement and diversify freshwater sources, particularly in arid coastal areas. Of 
the three dominant techniques to increase water supply without exploiting natural 
freshwater reservoirs - rainwater harvesting, wastewater recycling, and 
desalination (of seawater or brackish groundwater) – the latter is an increasingly 
common option, and is widely recommended as a climate change adaptation 
measure (e.g. Bates et al., 2008). A technique with origins dating back to 3000 BC 
(Al-Sofi, 2001), seawater desalination (hereafter desalination) has evolved to 
become a “mature techno-economic application” (Delyannis and Belessiotis, 2010: 
206), as major technological advances have significantly reduced the costs of the 
technology and process (Bernat et al., 2010; Khawaji et al., 2008), and energy 
demand (March, 2015), thereby rendering it increasingly viable. 
 
Much existing academic and institutional literature on desalination examines the 
nature of desalination technologies, their economic profiles, and their 
environmental impacts, predominantly concentrating on the scale of the 
desalination plant (NRC, 2008). The environmental impacts of desalination, 
comprising the effects of concentrated brine discharge on marine ecosystems, 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions, and the disposal of solid waste 
pollutants, have been well documented (Cooley et al., 2006; Mezher et al., 2011; 
Roberts et al., 2010). An emerging body of scholarship within social science of the 
environment has started to scrutinise the wider social and political implications of 
desalination, both conceptually and empirically. Studies have examined the 
development of the desalination industry, including its material and discursive 
drivers, financing strategies, and governance dimensions (Loftus and March, 2016; 
Swyngedouw, 2015; Swyngedouw and Williams, 2016), as well as the social and 
environmental consequences and implications of the availability and use of 
desalinated water (Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012; McDonnell, 2014; McEvoy, 
2014; McEvoy and Wilder, 2012; Meerganz von Medeazza, 2005). 
 
These studies focus on the production of desalinated water as an additional source 
of water, which complements and augments existing sources, whether to fulfil 
social needs (e.g. McEvoy, 2014; McEvoy and Wilder, 2012) or to foster capital 
accumulation (e.g. Loftus and March, 2016; McDonnell, 2014). In this paper, we 
extend these analyses by examining how desalinated water integrates with, and 
reconfigures, existing sources, and its wider social and political implications. We 
use the framework of the hydrosocial cycle to approach desalinated water as 
materially, economically, and symbolically distinct from freshwater, and to examine 
how its production disarticulates water resources and uses, and reworks 
hydrosocial relations. To ground our analysis, we use two cases from Chile, 
Antofagasta in the far north and Petorca in the central-northern region, where 
freshwater resources are pressured by intensive and high-value export industries: 
copper mining and fruit cultivation, respectively. While desalination has been 
developed in Antofagasta, where a large desalination plant has supplied drinking 
water to much of the region’s coastal urban population since 2003, Petorca is 
destined to receive two plants for drinking water and irrigation as a long-term 
drought mitigation measure under the aforementioned Plan, given that it has been 
one of the most severely affected regions. Our analysis is informed primarily by 
interviews and analysis of documentation, conducted between 2015 and 2017.4 
Our analysis reveals how desalination disarticulates drinking water from 
freshwater, with problematic implications. First, the desalination plants are 
dedicated primarily to domestic drinking water, yet do not serve to extend provision 
per se, but rather to substitute existing freshwater sources with desalinated water. 
This replacement, we assert, reconfigures the social relations of control over water, 
and generates new risks by rendering households dependent upon the conditions 
of production of desalinated water, such as centralised control and dependence on 
cost-effective energy. Second, in this way, desalinated water does not simply 
create additional water, but liberates existing freshwater sources for economic 
activities. We contend that desalination thus serves as a supply-led solution to fuel 
the same industries whose growth has depleted drinking water sources that are 
now being replaced with desalinated water. Moreover, this dynamic serves to 
create new opportunities for capital accumulation via the production of desalinated 
water on the one hand, and the expansion of these industries on the other. Third, 
Chile operates a system of water rights markets under the 1981 Water Code that is 
designed to manage demand, but which has been largely ineffective in curbing 
overexploitation of water (Budds, 2004, 2008). This, in turn, has subjected it to 
increased public scrutiny and pressure for reform (Budds, in press). We suggest 
that desalination serves as a supply-led solution that, by increasing water supply in 
times of crisis, serves to shore up the Water Code by alleviating the water 
problems that could be attributed to it. Paradoxically, the desalinated water that is 
stabilising the Water Code, and by extension Chile's neoliberal economic and 
political model (Budds, 2013), is not regulated by this legal framework. 
 
 
Following this introduction, in the next section we examine how desalination has 
been approached within the geography and political ecology literature, and 
consider how the hydrosocial cycle can frame an analysis of desalination and 
generate new insights. In section 3, we introduce Chile’s water markets model and 
present the two case studies of the introduction of desalination in Antofagasta and 
Petorca. In section 4, we discuss our results, before concluding in the final section. 
 
 
2. DESALINATION THROUGH THE HYDROSOCIAL CYCLE 
 
In this section, we review existing literature on the social and political dimensions 
of desalination in order to identify key issues, perspectives, and gaps. We then 
proceed to mobilise the framework of the hydrosocial cycle to analyse desalinated 
water as a form of manufactured water, whose conditions of production matter for 
its social relations of control. 
 
2.1 Social and political dimensions of desalination 
 
Desalination is, by definition, a supply-led approach to water, because it constitutes 
a new water source that complements or increases existing supply - often in 
response to shortages or uncertainties - rather than manages demand. However, 
geographers and political ecologists have highlighted that desalination has 
important material differences with other water supply strategies. First, it can be 
operated independently of hydrological conditions, potentially providing continuity 
of supply even in arid areas (Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012; Swyngedouw and 
Williams, 2016).  Second, due to its few productive uses and perceived 
abundance, unlike freshwater, seawater is usually not subject to water allocation 
and access norms, leading to its characterisation as an “unlimited” and 
“uncontested” resource (March et al., 2013; Swyngedouw, 2013, 2015; 
Swyngedouw and Williams, 2016). Third, despite some resistance to accept 
desalinated water for drinking (Budds and Hinojosa, 2012; McEvoy and Wilder, 
2012), it is still often culturally preferred over recycled wastewater (Rygaard et al., 
2011; McDonnell, 2014). These characteristics have influenced the impacts and 
dynamics of desalination, and thus are important to consider in analyses. 
 
Previous work examining desalination as a supply-led strategy has characterised it 
as a non-flexible, growth-oriented, and path-dependent solution to water scarcity 
(McEvoy and Wilder, 2012). While there exists a narrative that the production of 
desalinated water for drinking water can be environmentally beneficial by reducing 
pressure on existing freshwater that could be dedicated to other priority uses (e.g. 
ecological flows, food production) (McEvoy and Wilder, 2012), others contend that 
it could equally foster unsustainable water use, in particular by promoting non- 
essential water uses and discouraging water storage and conservation (arguably 
promoting maladaptation to climate change) (Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012; 
McDonnell, 2014; McEvoy and Wilder, 2012; Meerganz von Medeazza, 2005). For 
example, McDonnell (2014) described how the production of desalinated water in 
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, led to the transformation of a desert landscape 
into a cityscape replete with green vegetation and water features, and transformed 
cultural practices based on sparing water use into ones accustomed to 
exorbitance. The framing of desalination as a solution to water scarcity – 
ecological modernisation – is thus problematic given its potential to reproduce that 
same scarcity that it was designed to address. 
 
Other work has examined the introduction of desalinated water into drinking water 
supply, noting issues of differential vulnerability and environmental security 
(Agudelo-Vera et al., 2012; Kallis, 2008; Ludwig et al., 2011). Some studies have 
demonstrated that lower-income groups are negatively impacted by the 
introduction of desalinated water into the water supply network as higher and lower 
income households have differentiated capacities to respond to price increases 
(March and Saurí, 2009; McEvoy and Wilder, 2012; Renwick and Archibald, 1998). 
Others have shown that consumers of desalinated water do not use tap water for 
drinking due to quality concerns, demonstrating that, although desalination may 
overcome physical water scarcity, it can reproduce water insecurity at the 
household level (Fragkou and McEvoy, 2016; McEvoy, 2014). 
Attention to the wider political economy of desalination demonstrates how it goes 
beyond a technical solution to water scarcity, to present new opportunities for 
economic growth and capital accumulation, by both producing water for economic 
activities, as well as becoming a site for private investment itself (Loftus and 
March, 2016; Swyngedouw and Williams, 2016). Swyngedouw (2015) and 
Feitelson and Rosenthal (2012) argue that desalination provided a fix to the 
uneven geographies of water in Spain and Israel, respectively, and enabled those 
countries to continue water-intensive economic growth. Loftus and March (2016) 
show how desalination forms part of the commercial strategy of companies 
adopting it, through the case of the water utility in London, which maximised 
returns for shareholders by passing the cost of a large - and arguably unnecessary 
- desalination plant onto households’ future water bills. Budds and Hinojosa (2012) 
demonstrate a different strategy, whereby mining companies in Peru reduced 
energy costs by switching drinking water supply in coastal cities from mountain 
water to desalinated water, in order to be able to use mountain water for highland 
mining, rather than transport desalinated water. These studies of different 
dimensions of desalination as a supply-led strategy to water security help to show 
how desalination does not simply produce water, but also changes relations at the 
level of the household, city or industry. 
 
These analyses of how desalination reshapes political economies and water 
geographies are complemented by attention to how it affects water governance. 
Two studies of the effects of desalination on municipal drinking water provision in 
Mexican tourist resorts suggest conflicting results. McEvoy (2014) argued that, in 
Baja California Sur, it did not address the inadequacies of the existing water 
service, and alleviated pressure for institutional reform of water utilities, while 
Domínguez Aguilar and García de Fuentes (2007) observed that major hotels in 
Cancún adopted private desalination plants to avoid the problems (quality, 
continuity, cost) of the public water supply, a shift that could further destabilise that 
public service, as well as increasingly transfer water provision from the public to 
the private domain. Authors writing about the desalination industry in general echo 
the latter point, contending that it reinforces the role of the private sector in 
decision-making, and reconfigures the roles and power of water institutions 
(Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012; McDonnell, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2015; 
Swyngedouw and Williams, 2016). Writing on Spain, Swyngedouw (2015) and 
Swyngedouw and Williams (2016: 56) go further, by positing that desalination leads 
to a “consensual, politically uncontested form of governance”, whereby the creation 
of a new, separate and uncontested source of water served to forge consensus 
among disparate stakeholder groups that desalination formed an unproblematic 
and modern solution to the country’s water demands. These studies, however, 
have tended to focus on the governance of the plant or the industry, with less 
attention to the desalinated water produced. 
 
 
Our review thus far suggests that much of the existing scholarship on the social and 
political dimensions of desalination is concentrated on two themes: first, the effects and 
implications of desalination as a supply-led solution to address water shortages; and, 
second, the role of the desalination industry in fostering capital accumulation and 
influencing governance practices. While some attention is given to the social and cultural 
dynamics of desalinated water - social acceptability, affordability, cultural practices – as 
distinct from other sources of water, what is less explored is how desalinated water relates 
to other sources within the water mix and to what effect. Almost all existing literature treats 
desalinated water as an artificial and necessarily additional source that augments existing 
supplies to fulfil unmet demand – whether due to natural or produced scarcity – and 
overlooks the way in which it interacts with these existing sources and potentially 
reconfigures them within wider resource, economic, institutional and social assemblages. 
In this way, the existing literature links desalinated water with capital accumulation in two 
main ways: through the production of additional water for economic activities, and through 
investment opportunities in the industry itself. What merits attention, in addition, is how the 
reconfiguration of the water mix resulting from desalination could contribute to economic 
and political objectives, and transform access to water among different social actors. It is 
thus to the hydrosocial relations of desalinated water that we now turn. 
 
 
2.2 Desalination and hydrosocial relations 
 
As desalination manufactures freshwater from seawater, it constitutes a process 
through which water is made. This, we contend, renders it amenable to analysis 
within the framework of the hydrosocial cycle. The hydrosocial cycle is an 
approach to conceptualising and analysing society-water relations that goes 
beyond the recognition of the social relations and politics that exist around water, 
and instead emphasises the processes through which water is socially constructed 
and produced, in different contexts and under different configurations of power 
(Budds et al., 2014; Linton and Budds, 2014). Within the hydrosocial cycle, 
therefore, “water” is never seen as simply material or universal H2O, but as a 
socio-nature that becomes produced through socio-ecological processes, and 
which, in turn, reconfigures social structures, relations and subjectivities. What is 
important, therefore, is how water is produced, and how this process of production 
of water reconfigures social relations, recognising that different hydrosocial 
arrangements produce different waters, and that those different waters in turn 
produce different hydrosocial relations. Linton and Budds (2014: 170) define the 
hydrosocial cycle as “a socio-natural process by which water and society make and 
remake each other over space and time”, and argue that unravelling this process of 
making and remaking offers analytical insights into how water is produced, framed, 
contested and enrolled into wider agendas of socio-ecological change. This 
perspective, we suggest, is useful for drawing greater attention to the implications 
of desalinated water as an instance of water that enters and shapes the 
waterscape. 
 
So far, desalinated water has mainly been linked with the hydrosocial cycle through 
the nexus between water, capital, and power. The hydrosocial cycle thus draws 
attention to the way in which desalination reverses the hydrological cycle to make 
freshwater flow from the sea to the land (McDonnell 2014, Feitelson and Rosenthal 
2012; Swyngedouw, 2015), reflecting the idea that power makes water flow in the 
direction of capital. In this way, Loftus and March (2016) explored how London’s 
hydrosocial cycle was shaped by flows of water, finance, and energy, and how 
these elements converged to justify a major desalination plant.  By attending to 
how energy, water and capital intertwined within the hydrosocial cycle, the authors 
identified an agenda that had less to do with the challenges of providing water to a 
growing city amid climate change, but was rather related to the use of large-scale 
infrastructural assets to maximise returns for overseas investors. McDonnell’s 
study of Abu Dhabi coincides with this point. Her analysis through the hydrosocial 
cycle revealed that the transformation of the Emirate’s landscape from desert to 
oasis based on desalinated water was inherently precarious, since it depended on 
cheap imported natural gas from Qatar, counted on storage facilities that could only 
hold three days’ supply, and was subject to escalating demand as citizens became 
accustomed abundant water. Once again, these analyses tend to treat desalinated 
water as the product of the desalination industry, rather than an instance of water 
with particular conditions of production and hydrosocial relations. 
While these studies examine the production of water through the hydrosocial cycle, 
we suggest that approaching desalinated water as socially produced opens up new 
analytical possibilities by treating it as distinct from other types of water. This 
enables attentiveness to a different set of relations that may come into play in both 
the process of production of desalinated water, as well as its integration into the 
water mix. Desalinated water can thus be seen as a particular instance of water 
that becomes characterised by, and embedded in, particular social relations, as 
suggested by Budds and Hinojosa (2012) in the context of Peru, where an anti- 
mining activist contested the potential substitution of mountain water with 
desalinated water as the source of drinking water as replacing ‘live’ water with 
‘dead’ water. It is these analytical possibilities that we seek to develop to shed light 
on the processes and relations through which desalinated water – as distinct from 
any water – is produced and deployed. Therefore, our aim is to explore how 
desalinated water intersects with existing water sources and uses, and how this 
affects hydrosocial relations and the waterscape. For this, we turn next to our two 
case studies of Antofagasta and Petorca in Chile. 
 
3. DESALINATION IN WATER-SCARCE CHILE: CASE STUDIES OF 
ANTOFAGASTA AND PETORCA 
In this section, we analyse how desalination has emerged as a solution to water 
scarcity in Chile, and how the incorporation of desalinated water in regional water 
mixes has reconfigured water sources and social relations. Antofagasta and 
Petorca differ in terms of hydro-climatic conditions – arid and semi-arid - and by the 
type of export industry – copper mining, and fruit production, respectively. Yet, in 
both, intensive water use combined with water shortages has threatened the 
sustainability of the industries, against which the market mechanisms under the 
Chilean Water Code have been ineffective. 
 
We start by introducing the framework of the 1981 Water Code in order to provide 
contextual detail for the governance and regulatory framework, followed by a brief 
overview of the development of desalination in Chile. We then proceed to present 
the case studies, starting with Antofagasta Region, the site of Latin America’s 
largest desalination plant for human consumption since 2003, with well-studied 
impacts from the regional to the household levels (Fragkou and McEvoy, 2016; 
Fragkou, 2018). Antofagasta serves as an example of the use of desalinated water 
for drinking water as a long-term measure for mitigating water scarcity, which is 
advocated for replication elsewhere. We then turn to Petorca Province, where the 
significant expansion of fruit plantations for export since the 1990s has 
substantially increased legal and illegal groundwater extraction, leading to 
significant environmental and social impacts (Budds, 2004, 2008, 2009a; Guiloff, 
2013). As a result of the 2014-15 drought, desalination plants for each of the 
Petorca and the La Ligua river basins have been proposed to fulfil rural water 




3.1 The 1981 Water Code 
Chile operates a system of water rights markets to manage water allocation, under 
the 1981 Water Code (Bauer, 1998). Formulated according to free market 
economics and political liberalism under the military regime (1973-90), the system 
designates water rights as private property to provide users with security of tenure, 
and enables water trading to manage demand by incentivising reallocation. Water 
rights are needed for all uses except rural drinking water, with surface water and 
groundwater designated as separate rights. Once water rights are allocated, there 
is no fee for water use, but there is a tax on non-use after five years (Budds, 2013). 
Desalinated water is considered a private good, and is not regulated by the Water 
Code.5 
From 1981, water rights could be acquired in three ways: (1) existing water rights 
were converted into private water rights; (2) new water rights to available sources 
were allocated; and (3) water rights could be purchased from other owners. Once 
available water rights for a source were fully allocated, redistribution was expected 
to happen through the market according to supply and demand, although markets 
in water rights throughout Chile have been largely inactive (Bauer, 1998; Budds, 
2004, in press; Prieto, 2016). 
 
In 2005, minor reforms were made to the Water Code following 13 years of debate 
in Congress. Key concerns were the speculative accumulation of water rights, and 
inadequate provisions for groundwater management and environmental flows. The 
process was controversial and protracted because the Water Code was an 
emblematic free-market policy of the military regime, and was vigorously defended 
– irrespective of evidence - by those who had supported that regime (Budds, 
2013). Yet, following a series of high profile water conflicts concerning illegal 
extraction and over-exploitation throughout Chile, the Water Code has attracted 
renewed public scrutiny, and civil society organisations have called for the 
privatised and marketised system to be overturned (Budds, in press; Larraín and 
Segura, 2017). 
3.2 Development of desalination in Chile 
 
Desalination is a relatively new industry in Chile. The first plants were constructed 
in northern Chile, including a private one to serve a large copper mine in response 
to the unavailability of new water rights, the cost of purchasing water rights, and 
controversy over potential infringement of indigenous customary entitlements 
(Budds, 2009b, 2010). The Chilean Copper Commission (COCHILCO) estimates 
that, by 2025, 35 per cent of water for copper mining will come from desalination 
plants, many of which are expected to be private (Comisión de Recursos Hídricos 
y Desertificación, 2016). 
 
Under the 2015 National Drought Management Plan, desalination became a new 
strategy to increase water supply in response to both increased demand and 
growing scarcity, which impact both economic activities and drinking water 
provision (Gobierno de Chile, 2015b, 2017). The Ministry of Public Works 
(Ministerio de Obras Públicas, 2017: n/p) reflects this supply-led stance, 
considering seawater as “an inexhaustible source for the country” that can 
“guarantee the timely supply of high quality water for irrigation and drinking water”. 
The Commission for Water Resources and Desertification of the Chamber of 
Deputies of the Chilean Parliament, echoes this perspective, concluding that “the 
solution to the excessive use of freshwater, therefore, lies in taking forward the 
construction and use of desalination plants” (Comisión de Recursos Hídricos y 
Desertificación, 2016: 3). Nevertheless, the Commission stressed that the mining 
industry should switch to desalination to fulfil its water needs, noting that drinking 
water should not be secondary to economic activities; a stance contradicted by the 
state Water and Sewerage Concessionary Company (ECONSSA), which stated 
that desalination “will enable the state to undertake commercial activities oriented 
towards the supply of drinking water for the population” (idem: 6). 
 
Of the five new desalination plants proposed in 2015, four will be commissioned by 
the government’s Directorate of Hydraulic Works, with the entire process (feasibility 
study, environmental impact assessment, environmental authorisations, design, 
construction) being tendered, while the fifth will be awarded as a concession 




Figure 1: Location of Antofagasta Region and Petorca Province, Chile (Source: 




3.3 Antofagasta Region 
 
Antofagasta Region, situated in northern Chile (see Figure 1), hosts both the 
world’s driest desert and its largest copper reserves, with a 35 per cent share in 
world markets (COCHILCO, 2010). Extracting hard rock minerals under arid 
conditions has been a historical challenge in the Atacama Desert, reflected by the 
installation of the world’s first solar-powered desalination plant to serve local 
saltpetre mines and traders in 1872 (Arellano Escudero, 2011). 
Since the nineteenth century, mining, urban growth, and water supply infrastructure 
have been co-evolving in this region (Lagos and Blanco, 2010). Antofagasta has 
undergone radical socio-territorial transformations as a consequence of the copper 
mining boom of the 1990s, and rapid urban expansion, as a direct result of the 
region’s economic development (Arias et al., 2014). Between 1996 and 2011, 
urban and industrial land uses have increased from some 3,300 to 196,000 
hectares, while wetlands and agricultural land have decreased significantly (IDE, 
2017). At the same time, the region’s population has increased by 50 per cent 
since 1992, with over 97 per cent of the total population in 2016 being urban 
inhabitants, principally residing in the region’s coastal cities and towns. 
By the 1990s, the water needs of the rapidly growing mining sector generated a 
situation of water stress in the region (Gobierno Regional de Antofagasta, 2008). 
At that time, the regional water utility, ESSAN (Empresa Sanitaria de Antofagasta 
SA), was a state-owned company created during the government of Patricio Aylwin 
(1990-94). The utility was corporatised in order to make it attractive for its future 
privatisation, and, as part of this plan, it was charged with developing a long-term 
strategy for securing water supply for the Region’s socioeconomic development. 
To achieve this, first, ESSAN entered into contracts with regional mining 
companies for the provision of raw water for industrial use (Fragkou, 2018). 
Second, to secure water to fulfil these contracts, in 2001, ESSAN awarded a Build- 
Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract to a Spanish company, INIMA, to construct the La 
Chimba desalination plant in the regional capital, the coastal city of Antofagasta. 
Using the desalinated water to supply the Region’s main urban consumers in 
Antofagasta (approximately 400,000 inhabitants), would thus release the 
company’s (inland) water rights for the direct sale of freshwater to the mining 
sector. As a result, upon its impending privatisation, the concessionaire would not 
only have access to ESSAN’s water rights, but the water provision agreements 
with the mining sector, plus the complete control and management of the La 
Chimba desalination plant, an additional source of water that would fragment the 
Region’s water mix between drinking water for human consumption and raw water 
for industrial use. 
 
In 2003, three months after the desalination plant entered into operation, Aguas 
Antofagasta SA took control of the water company, through a 30-year concession 
contract. Aguas Antofagasta was part of Antofagasta plc, a major national 
conglomeration of mining and transport companies that owns two of the nine large 
mines in the region. Since then, desalinated water production has increased from 
150 litres per second in 2003, to 850 litres per second in 2017, and has been 
gradually substituting freshwater as the source of Antofagasta’s urban water 
supply. This has allowed Aguas Antofagasta to not only maintain the existing water 
supply contracts, but also add three new ones, including for the two mines owned 
by Antofagasta plc.  By 2016, the total volume of water sold to the mines, 
according to the contracts in force, was just over 17 million cubic metres per year7; 
the La Chimba desalination plant produced 19 million cubic metres in the same 
year. 
This implies that the gradual substitution of freshwater with desalinated water for 
human consumption in the region’s coastal cities, which concentrate 70 per cent of 
its population, is part of a longer-term plan to secure water for mining in the 
national interest. The port town of Mejillones (10,000 inhabitants) is already being 
supplied exclusively with water from the La Chimba plant, which is being expanded 
to be able to supply all of the city of Antofagasta, and complemented by a 
additional project underway in the town of Tocopilla (24,000 inhabitants). 
Representatives of the current owners of the water utility since 2015, the 
Colombian company EPM (Empresas Públicas de Medellín) claims that the plant 
was constructed in order to supply Antofagasta’s expanding population, attributed 
to the success of the region’s mining sector. This is contradicted by a report from 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 2003, which states that the water 
produced by the plant will gradually replace the use of freshwater for drinking water 
in the city of Antofagasta, and that “the substituted water will be negotiated with the 
mining companies that require it for their new expansion projects” (IDB, 2003: 21). 
Therefore, desalination has facilitated the disarticulation of the regional water mix, 
through the allocation of desalinated water to human consumption in the coastal 
cities, and freshwater for mining activities in the inland highlands. 
In Antofagasta, the substitution of freshwater with desalinated water implies more 
than the replacement of one source of water with another. The La Chimba plant 
has expedited household connections to the water network and added value to 
neighbourhoods (Martín and Sánchez, 2002). It is also associated with urban 
expansion, as Antofagasta has experienced its most rapid rate of urban growth rate 
since the plant came into operation, as green spaces have increased, and absolute 
and per capita water consumption levels have also risen (Fragkou and Vásquez, 
2018). Some authors thus claim that desalinated water has reduced water 
shortages, improved continuity of service, and greatly improved water quality, 
having overcome the chronic problem of the natural presence of arsenic8 in 
freshwater sources (Martín and Sánchez, 2002). Yet, other studies indicate that 
some residents of Antofagasta avoid the direct intake of tap water – sometimes 
even for cooking - because of its organoleptic properties, fears over its health 
effects, and/or mistrust in the water company (Fragkou and McEvoy, 2016). This 
suggests that access to water is in practice not improved, especially for lower- 
income households, who resort to time-consuming and precarious methods for 
household water treatment, saving and storage, as well as purchase bottled water 
of uncertain quality (Fragkou, 2018). In this way, desalination is potentially 
increasing what is effectively self-disconnection from the water supply network. 
 
Furthermore, the gradual introduction of desalinated water into the city’s water mix 
has altered the nature of water supply for its inhabitants. Since the introduction of 
desalination, different parts of the city have been supplied with water that comes 
from three sources and is qualitatively different: freshwater, desalinated water, and 
a mixture of both. This is important, because the quality of desalinated water is 
slightly but always more negatively perceived than that of freshwater in the city, 
even when consumers are not aware of the source of water that they are 
consuming (Fragkou, 2018). The issue of perception of desalinated water in the 
specific context of Antofagasta is exacerbated by the sea being regarded as “dirty”, 
since the plant is in a bay that hosts the city’s industrial port and into which its 
wastewater is discharged. 
 
The water supply system also has implications in terms of cost and governance. 
Initially, urban residents did not pay more for drinking water that derived from 
desalinated water, despite higher production costs, because this was offset by the 
profits from the sale of water to the mining sector. However, the new parent 
company has plans to raise future tariffs accordingly, potentially when all coastal 
urban water supply is transferred to desalinated water.9 As desalination has been 
conducted in a top-down way in the region, most of the residents are not even 
aware that they are being supplied with desalinated water, and there has been no 
opportunity for public consultation on the gradual substitution of their water source 
from freshwater to desalinated water, and its implications in terms of quality, cost 
and continuity. 
3.4 Petorca Province 
 
Petorca Province is located in Valparaíso Region, and comprises the two small 
river basins of Petorca and La Ligua, which rise in the Andean foothills and so have 
low river flows during the summer (see Figure 1).10 The region is characterised by 
a semi-arid Mediterranean climate, and its economy is based on agriculture with a 
small proportion of mining. Agriculture traditionally comprised a mix of annual and 
perennial crops, on both large commercial and small family farms. Given Chile’s 
emphasis on developing export industries under the military regime, fruit 
production significantly expanded since the 1990s (Budds, 2004). Table 1 shows 
the development of avocado production in Petorca Province, indicating a steep 
increase between 1997 and 2008 as plantations expanded, followed by a similarly 





Year Area (hectares) Source 
1997 2799 INE, 1997 
2002 5659 ODEPA-CIREN, 2002 
2008 8670 ODEPA-CIREN, 2008 
2014 5595 ODEPA-CIREN, 2014 
2017 4807 ODEPA-CIREN, 2017 
 
 




While agriculture had traditionally been irrigated with surface water from La Ligua 
river, the expansion of fruit plantations, primarily on rain-fed land on the valley 
slopes, led to demand for groundwater, which had been hitherto underexploited 
(Budds, 2004). Applications for groundwater rights rose steeply, and in 2004 
allocation was finalised, and the aquifer declared closed to future allocation 
(Budds, 2009a). 
 
Until around 2009, the province was able to sustain the expanded agricultural 
production in years with normal precipitation, likely due to groundwater reserves, 
with scarcity only emerging in years with lower rainfall (Budds, in press). However, 
from the start of a prolonged period of drought in 2010, most summers became 
characterised by severe water scarcity, as lower rainfall was no longer sufficient to 
sustain the flows of Petorca and La Ligua rivers, and adequately recharge aquifer 
levels, and as matured fruit plantations required more water (Budds, in press). By 
2016, Valparaíso Region was characterised by the greatest hydrological deficit in 
the country, with surface and groundwater levels at between 30 and 100 per cent 
below normal levels (DGA, 2016). 
The drought had severe impacts on agriculture and drinking water. With irrigation 
canals diminished or empty, and many wells dry as water tables fell to depths of 
around 80 metres or more, much agricultural land could no longer be irrigated. 
Many areas planted with fruit trees were cropped in an effort to save them, in effect 
becoming unproductive for that and the two subsequent seasons needed for 
regrowth. Areas planted with annual crops were either temporarily abandoned, or 
converted to low density livestock rearing. Small and family farmers, with the 
fewest resources to be able to invest in the most common responses – deepening 
existing wells, drilling new wells, constructing storage ponds or purchasing water 
from other farmers - were the most affected by the drought (Budds, in press). 
 
Rural drinking water supply systems were also severely affected, as the majority 
relied on wells as their water source, most of which were no longer deep enough to 
yield water.11  As a result, the municipal governments of the province,12 which were 
legally obliged to provide drinking water, contracted emergency water tankers to fill 
village water cisterns.13 The tankers were run by private licensed operators, and 
supplied approximately a third of the rural population from 2011 onwards (Budds, in 
press), at a cost of approximately USD 10 million between 2014 and 2016 for 
Petorca Province (CIPER, 2017). 
 
The Chilean government announced a range of emergency measures in response 
to the drought, which were financed by the central government, and coordinated by 
the Provincial Government of Petorca. In 2014, a supreme decree14 announced a 
feasibility study for a desalination plant for the province, to provide rural drinking 
water to replace the water tankers, and the 2015 National Drought Management 
Plan subsequently defined plants for each of Petorca and La Ligua river basins. 
The Ministry of Public Works (2017) set out plans for two reverse osmosis plants to 
supply village water systems that were no longer self-sufficient, and additional 
irrigation water, to be maintained as separate supplies. The projects included 
pumping stations and transmission pipelines to village systems throughout the 
basins, to supply 48 and 67 litres per second of drinking water in Petorca and La 
Ligua, respectively. Each plant will cost USD 38 million (excluding land aquisition), 
commissioned by the Directorate of Hydraulic Works, producing a running cost 
(excluding capital costs) of USD 0.40/m3 and 0.34/m3 for Petorca15 and La Ligua, 
respectively. Each plant will also produce 1000 litres per second to irrigate 3750 
hectares of mainly export fruit (avocado, citrus, table grape, nuts, tomato), with 
beneficiaries expected to make a 93 per cent contribution to the cost, thus 
apparently subsidising the construction of the plants for rural drinking water. The 
tenders were due to be published in 2016. 
 
The proposal to introduce desalination to address deficiencies in rural water supply 
in Petorca Province ignores that water scarcity is caused by a combination of 
reduced precipitation and the overexploitation of water for commercial fruit 
plantations. Increasing water through desalination therefore serves to sustain and, 
moreover, legitimise, an arguably unsustainable level of agriculture (see Budds in 
press). Desalination is therefore not simply a means to ensure rural drinking water 
needs, but also a means of, in principle, liberating the groundwater that they relied 
upon and essentially transferring it to the agricultural sector. While wells for rural 
drinking water systems are exempt from water rights, they still constitute a historic 
entitlement for this use.16 
 
In this way, desalination would disarticulate rural drinking water from the water 
resources of the province, also reflected in the production of separate flows for 
rural drinking water and irrigation by the desalination plant. On the one hand, this 
enables drinking water – which is guaranteed by the state – to be divorced from 
agricultural water use so that it no longer depends on the behaviour of farmers. On 
the other hand, it forms new opportunities for capital accumulation, through the 
construction and operation of the desalination plant, and the provision of 
desalinated water to an existing and dependent customer base. That said, it is the 
sale of water to irrigators that would seem to render the desalination plant 
financially viable for rural water supply. 
The cost implications of replacing rural drinking water from village wells17 with 
desalinated water are likely to be significant due to its production costs, even if the 
plant were subsidised by the state and/or irrigators. Rural drinking water systems 
are organised as village-based autonomous committees or cooperatives, for which 
the initial infrastructure and training is provided by the state, and which then 
continue operation and maintenance with user fees.18 Replacing well water with 
desalinated water is not a simple fix to the problem of scarcity, because even if the 
cost is subsidised in the short term, it is not guaranteed over the medium or long 
terms. 
 
Moreover, replacing well water with desalinated water implies a shift of control over 
water from the villages – who have both legal rights to and autonomous control 
over their water19 – to arrangements that are as yet uncertain. Desalinated water 
could render village systems susceptible not only to cost increases but other future 
changes in water supply, such as quality or continuity, which they may not be able 
to influence. Again, a switch to desalinated water is more than the simple 
substitution of one source of water with another: it is a fundamental change in the 
institutional arrangements around rural water supply, whereby the rural population 
would potentially lose their autonomy over their water provision. 
 
 
4. DESALINATION AND THE DISARTICULATION OF WATER RESOURCES 
 
From a water management perspective, the two case studies could easily be 
interpreted as a ‘win-win’ situation, whereby desalination provided a secure water 
supply in the face of extreme water shortages and competition between uses. In 
this way, desalinated water could be seen to solve the problems of water continuity 
and quality that were affecting households, while simultaneously enabling the 
prioritisation of freshwater allocation to key economic sectors. A simple cost- 
benefit analysis of this water management arrangement would support its 
environmental, social, and economic efficiency. However, this assessment is 
predicated upon a view of water as homogenous, which privileges the supply of 
water and disregards the social relations of control over water. Employing the 
hydrosocial cycle to examine the social construction and production of water 
frames desalinated water as materially, economically, and symbolically distinct from 
freshwater, and exploring the dynamics of its integration into the water mix enables 
us to identify a series of direct and more implicit implications. 
In the two Chilean cases, the desalination plants are promoted and initially 
developed by the state primarily for human consumption rather than for productive 
activities. This contrasts with other contexts, where desalinated water is mainly 
used for large-scale irrigation (e.g. Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012). Yet, our cases 
demonstrate that the replacement of existing freshwater sources used for drinking 
water with desalinated water serves to create a freshwater surplus that can be 
diverted to dominant local industries. Furthermore, that the surplus comprises 
freshwater is also important, because this entails extraction (mainly groundwater 
pumping) costs, as opposed to production costs in the case of desalinated water, 
and is thus cheaper. Therefore, in Antofagasta, the liberated freshwater is 
convenient for its geographical proximity to the mining industry, whereas 
desalinated water would have to be produced and then transported inland. In 
Petorca, it is beneficial by protecting drinking water from the potential 
overexploitation of groundwater by farmers, and, at least in principle, some or all of 
the production cost can relatively easily be passed to households, who are already 
used to paying for water supply. 
 
This means that desalination, as a supply-led approach, does not challenge the 
unsustainable nature of water-intensive industries, and instead sustains them in 
the face of potentially constraining water shortages. This, in turn, suggests that the 
Chilean State uses desalination as a strategy for securing water for its economic 
sectors; yet not by using desalinated water directly for industrial use, but instead 
indirectly, by diverting drinking water to desalination in order to free up freshwater 
for industries.  This strategy of securing water allows Chile to protect the 
production of its key exports, including copper and fresh fruit, on the one hand, and 
to enhance the competitiveness of these products in international markets, on the 
other. 
The case of Antofagasta suggests that the integration of desalination also 
facilitates new ways of promoting capital accumulation within the water industry. 
When the regional water utility (ESSAN) was privatised, its water rights - used to 
supply drinking water to most of the region’s coastal urban population, and raw 
water contracted by the mining sector - were included in the concession. This 
enabled Aguas Antofagasta to dominate the region’s water resources, and 
therefore control their distribution to both main sectors – urban and mining - in a 
way that became interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Therefore, switching 
urban drinking water progressively to desalinated water enabled Aguas 
Antofagasta to maximise the value of its freshwater rights by selling volumes of raw 
water to the mining industry. This reorganisation of the region’s water according to 
commercial strategy supports previous findings that desalination can bring about 
changes both in water allocation at the basin scale, and in underlying power 
structures in the water sector (Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012).20 
The switch of urban water supply from freshwater to desalinated water has wider 
ramifications, however. As noted above, as a produced (rather than extracted) 
source, desalinated water is more expensive, and production costs depend 
primarily on the costs of materials and consumables (e.g. membranes), and 
energy. In Chile, desalination plants are operated by energy produced using 
imported fossil fuels, which is subject to fluctuations in both price and supply. In 
Antofagasta, desalinated water is expected to increase water tariffs in the medium 
term. Furthermore, transferring the entire urban water supply to desalination 
exposes the system to power cuts, mechanical failures, algal blooms, or damage 
from seismic events. 
The development of desalination in Chile reflects a top-down approach to water 
provision, that relies on large and centralised infrastructure requiring significant 
capital investment and operational costs, and excluding public participation in the 
decision-making process (McEvoy and Wilder, 2012). This approach fits Chile’s 
technical and technocratic approach to water management (Budds, 2009a, 2013), 
and was exacerbated by the emergency measures legitimised by the 2015 drought 
(Budds, in press). In this way, desalination was introduced in Antofagasta with no 
participation of water consumers, even leaving them unaware of the source of 
water they were consuming (Fragkou, 2018). Its proposal in Petorca has entailed 
no consultation with village systems over how the new desalinated water supply 
will interface with their existing systems based on communal sources. In the case 
of Petorca, this is especially significant, because the introduction of desalination 
threatens to shift the social relations of control of water provision from village 
autonomy over both water sources and water systems, to ones of dependence on 
other providers. 
The issue of governance brings us to the role of the Water Code. As a supply-led 
approach, desalination does not challenge the unequal distribution of water rights, 
but instead further reinforces the accumulation of freshwater by economic sectors 
under the Water Code, at the expense of lower-income and/or marginalised water 
users (Budds, 2004, 2009b, 2010; Prieto, 2015, 2016). In this way, desalination 
could be regarded as a new means of accumulation by disarticulating and 
reworking water resources. 
 
Water rights markets21 have been inactive throughout Chile (Bauer, 1998; Budds, 
2004, in press; Prieto, 2016), and both Antofagasta and Petorca are clear 
examples of how the Water Code has failed to achieve the reallocation of water in 
areas characterised by both acute scarcity and high demand. In both case studies, 
the Chilean State has resorted to desalination to increase supply in the face of the 
ineffectiveness of the Water Code to manage demand, in order to sustain thirsty 
industries and avert crises. This supports previous findings from Chile that, in 
practice, demand is fulfilled by the exploitation of new sources of water 
(groundwater, reservoirs) rather than trading in water rights (Budds, 2004, 2009b), 
and that the state intervenes to address water shortages, thereby undermining the 
core principles of the Water Code of using markets to manage demand, and 
delegating water management to water rights holders (Budds, in press). 
 
Increasing the supply of water through desalination also avoids controversial 
alternatives, such as compulsory repurchases or expropriation of water rights, 
which would entail high political, economic, and social costs, in keeping with 
studies that show that desalination has been used by states to avoid conflict and 
alleviate pressure on existing water management models (March and Saurí, 2008; 
McEvoy, 2014; Swyngedouw and Williams, 2016; Swyngedouw, 2015). The latter 
is extremely pertinent in Chile, given the ongoing debate over the effectiveness of 
the Water Code and increasing pressure for major reform. The Chilean state has 
intervened to address drought with state-led, supply-led, and top-down 
infrastructural solutions, in order to annihilate the circumstances that potentially 
challenge the Water Code (Budds, in press). Therefore, we suggest that the 
introduction of desalination is more than simply a means of sustaining export-led 
capital accumulation in the face of drought, and is simultaneously a means to 
shore up the Water Code against pressure for reform. Paradoxically, however, 
desalinated water is a non-regulated water flow in Chile, meaning that the source 
that is stabilising the Water Code is not actually covered by it.22 
Nevertheless, it is institutional reform that has a crucial role in promoting water 
conservation measures and cultures in conjunction with the development of supply- 
led solutions, in order to avoid the vicious circle of increased demand leading to 
increased supply, as noted in multiple previous assessments. Michelle Bachelet’s 
note of caution while launching Chile’s desalination programme is thus important, if 
neglected: 
 
We also need to make cultural and institutional changes that will allow 






In this paper, we have mobilised the framework of the hydrosocial cycle to 
approach desalinated water as materially, economically, and symbolically different 
from freshwater, in order to argue that the introduction of desalination does not 
merely increase available water, but also serves to disarticulate water resources 
and uses, and rework hydrosocial relations in potentially problematic ways. This, 
we suggest, contributes new insights to critical studies of desalination, which, to 
date, have recognised and explored the contested nature and effects of the 
industry, as well as the social dynamics of desalinated water, but have not 
examined the introduction of desalinated water into the water mix. 
 
Our overarching argument is that desalination enables the reorganisation of the 
allocation of water sources to existing uses, according to economic and/or political 
agendas. This has important economic, political, and social implications that are 
related to the advantages of freshwater (cost, quality, location) on the one hand, 
and desalinated water’s conditions of production (including the cost of inputs, its 
organisation and scale, its governance and regulation, and its exposure to risks) on 
the other. Importantly, this insight emerges from two particular elements of the 
hydrosocial cycle. The first is considering differentiating between  desalinated 
water and freshwater, and the specific relations that their conditions and/or 
production entail; otherwise the substitution of “water” with “water” appears 
commensurate and unproblematic. The second is attending to the interests and 
motives that are pursued through the production, organisation, and framing of 
water, and which go beyond its material flows and uses. 
 
This overarching argument comprises three more specific contentions. 
 
First, the substitution of freshwater by desalinated water reconfigures the social 
relations of control over water in potentially uneven ways. Switching drinking water 
supply to desalinated water can generate new risks for populations, including low- 
income groups, by exposing them to the instabilities associated with the production 
of desalinated water, fostering self-disconnection from tap water where desalinated 
water is perceived as inferior, and undermining community water governance by 
replacing local water systems with centrally produced and distributed networks. 
This reflects a dynamic whereby less powerful groups are dispossessed of their 
existing, preferred, and entitled water sources as these are captured by more 
powerful economic and political actors, which brings us to our next argument. 
Second, the disarticulation of water resources by desalination reveals an additional 
strategy for capital accumulation, beyond the hitherto recognised investment 
opportunities in the desalination industry, and the provision of additional water to 
key industries.  The introduction of desalinated water permits the diversion of 
(more advantageous) freshwater to (higher value) economic uses, creating 
opportunities for actors that do not use desalinated water directly but which benefit 
from the liberated freshwater. Where this results in the diversion of water to 
industries that exacerbate scarcity, it potentially stabilises unequal water resources 
distribution and the domination of unsustainable forms of economic production, as 
reflected in our final argument. 
Third, this dynamic can contribute to the stabilisation and legitimisation of existing 
water management regimes and institutions, where it conceals, or postpones, their 
ineffectiveness in securing water for all actors and avoiding conflicts. This is 
particularly important because desalinated water does not necessarily conform to, 
or is not always regulated by, existing water policy frameworks. We suggest that 
these implications can be extrapolated to other water flows that are centrally 
produced and are alternatives to freshwater, such as recycled wastewater. Given 
that these alternative technologies are heavily promoted as adaptation strategies in 
water stressed territories around the globe, the social, economic, and political 
impacts of their intertwining with freshwater flows deserve greater attention in 






In this way, our analysis extends the analytical scope of the hydrosocial cycle by 
contemplating the production and intertwining of multiple instances of water that 
have distinct material, economic, symbolic, and regulatory characteristics, in order 
to shed light on the operation of economic and political agendas through water, and 
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